What was the purpose and purpose of President Anastasiadis's letter to Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar, delivered on May 23 by Greek negotiator Menelaos Menelaos to Turkish Cypriot counterpart Ergun Olgun? In the six-letter letter, President Anastasiadis addressed a friendly appeal to his friend Ersin Tatar to resume a spearhead dialogue of some Confidence Building Measures, in which the besieged city of Famagusta and the airport of Tympos are in focus. The basic idea is to put Varosi under UN control and at the same time under the supervision of the UN to operate Tympos Airport as a legal international airport. In his letter, President Anastasiadis recalls the whole acquis of the talks: The Christofias-Talat convergences, the joint document he signed with Dervis Eroglu and, of course, the Crans Montana conference.
If one did not know what Nikos Anastasiadis really wants and believes, one might applaud this effort as a sincere move to finally end the debate on the Cyprus issue, which according to Secretary General Antonio Guterres, in Crans Montana reached a kilometer away. from reaching and signing the final solution.
Objections
In Cran Montana in July 2017, this last kilometer was not traveled because President Anastasiadis had in front of him a more important goal according to him. To return to Cyprus, to win the elections of January 2018 and to continue selling passports to fraudsters and non-fraudsters, with Nikos Christodoulidis as his accomplice and advisor. Today, in the face of the new accomplishments that have been created and seeing the outcry that he preferred the same benefit from the interest of the Cypriot people, he circulates justifiably and says indiscriminately -even in the first case- “that he could not sign an agreement in Crans Montana which would turn Cyprus into Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also Lebanon. “
One wonders, then, if Mr. Anastasiadis considers that the acquis of the talks that led to the Crans Montana meeting would end up becoming Lebanon, how five years later does he send a letter to Tatar asking him to resume the talks? Has it decided today that with the solution we will become neither Lebanon nor Bosnia and Herzegovina?
Does anyone still believe, following the course of the Cyprus issue today, that Turkey and Tatar are in the mood for a solution? On the other hand, by order of the Turkish vice president, Ankara last Thursday changed the operating status of the occupied airport of Tympos. This was done, he says, to reduce the cost of tickets. This decision is probably another step towards the integration of the occupiers in Turkey. If Erdogan sees that he will not be elected in the spring of 2023, it is possible that he will resort to the annexation of northern Cyprus in an attempt to win all the votes of the country's nationalists
Tactician
The bad thing about Mr. Anastasiadis – although Ankara's stance on the Cyprus issue is absurd – no one can trust him. With what credibility does President Anastasiadis send this letter publicly, while in his private discussions and analyzes he says other things? Who f & # 8217; can she really take him seriously? Mr. Anastasiadis is also clearly aware of the problems he has created. It is not naive.
Is he, of course, a tactician, knowing that he is addressing the naive on the inside, so is it worthwhile to go into the details of his purpose in relation to this letter? What did he seek?
First , wants to show that it seeks mobility in the Cyprus issue. Ioannis Kasoulidis and Averof Neophytou are also pushing in this direction. Especially Averoff would feel much more comfortable with mobility in the Cyprus issue in the middle of the pre-election period, since his main opponent Nikos Christodoulidis already rejects the MOE. At the same time, with this letter, he considers that no one can criticize him on the Cyprus issue in the last months of his presidency. In practice, Nikos Anastasiadis rejects everything. He sent the letter, of course, because he is probably sure that Turkey and Tatar will not respond, at least until the end of his term. Retiring, the President will have to say that “until the last minute I tried, but the other side did not respond”.
Second , properly anticipating the upheaval and unrest in the Turkish Cypriot community due to the economic crisis, puts in the foreground the MOEs to send the message to the Turkish Cypriots that through Erzan and the port of Famagusta huge benefits will come from tourism and trade . He was successful in that. Former Turkish Cypriot negotiator and now-opposition politician Kudret Ozersay says Anastasiadis has put Tatar in the corner, while Geniduzen, who echoes the views of the Turkish Republican Party, has been accusing Tatars of rejecting the rebels by rejecting and hunger.
Third , sent the letter with positions that he knows will not be accepted, since they have been rejected several times in the past, even by Mustafa Akinci, because it rightly smells that the Turkish Cypriots are also preparing their own proposals. This was evident through the rejection of Tatar, who stated that the Turkish Cypriot side will submit its own proposals much more realistic based on the situation and the realities that prevail today in Cyprus. So the proposals he submitted will act as a counterweight.
Fourth , sent the letter in a desperate attempt to manage the image and reputation in the EU and the United Nations, as it is considered one of the main reasons for the failure of the talks. There is currently a huge risk due to Ukrainian. If, in the end, the war ends with profits for Russia, the creation of a confederate state between Ukraine and Donbass, or the recognition of the secession of some Ukrainian territories with European blessings, as shown by some moves by Emanuel Macron, this may also apply to Cyprus. It is likely that at some point we will reach this point, but Mr. Anastasiadis wishes and prays that this does not happen in the next 8 months.
Dizoniki is also going
In short, Anastasiadis's letter, if it achieved anything tangible, was to re-run the counterproductive process of a blame game between the two sides. Unfortunately, things in Cyprus after Crans Montana have taken a turn for the worse. At a point where those who want to deal with the Cyprus problem realistically conclude that there is very little chance of discussing directly a comprehensive settlement process on the Cyprus issue on the basis of the Bi-Zonal Bicommunal Federation.
Talking to politicians on both sides of the roadblock, there is a major convergence of views. That the Cyprus issue should be resolved step by step. The difference lies in the quality of measures and policies that will lead to the normalization of things. But even that seems difficult, if not impossible. The Turkish Cypriot side wants low-confidence confidence-building measures that will gradually upgrade the Turkish Cypriot state. Economic, scientific, educational cooperation measures and joint actions in some areas that are considered painless. The Greek Cypriot side submitted proposals which, if accepted, would disrupt the status quo, bring it in its view to a more advantageous position, but again would not lead to a total solution. We all now understand the situation in Cyprus. Unless something changes after the presidential elections in Cyprus, unless an agreement is reached to fully negotiate the problem, the process of legalizing the perpetrators of the invasion of Cyprus will take place.
