“Most of the leaders of the right side did not have the courage to take those decisions that would lead to the reunification of Cyprus “, the author of the book
said in an interview with “P”.A few days ago, the new book by Christos P. Panagiotidis entitled “The Asia Minor Disaster of 1922 and the Cyprus Disaster of 1974 – A Comparative Narrative” was published, in which the main protagonists of these two dramatic events in the history of Greece and Cyprus. Reference is made to the historical and political context of the above two disasters and the author identifies the great similarities that exist but also the differences. The author proceeds with a brief presentation of the plans for the solution of the Cyprus issue that have been proposed from time to time and important documents that have charted the course of modern Cypriot history. It also assesses the attitude and actions of all the Presidents of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as the leadership of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Britain and the USA.
In your book you attempt a comparison between the Asia Minor Disaster of 1922 and the Cyprus Disaster of 1974. What led you to this comparison? Are there similarities between the two disasters? Are there differences?
In Asia Minor and Cyprus we had two solid masses of Greek-speaking Christians who ardently wanted to be integrated into the Greek state, which was born in 1830. In both cases, the achievement of the goal failed miserably. I confess that I was curious to see if there were any essential similarities between these two tragic pages of Greek history. I found the similarities—in terms of the causes that led to the disaster—to be striking. Epigrammatically, the similarities could be summarized as follows:
• Lack of political experience and political foresight on the part of our leadership at the time of the disaster. From March 1921 to September 1922, Greece was ruled by 8 different royalist Prime Ministers, with terms ranging from 1 day to 11 months, while, from 1950 to 1974, the reins of power in Cyprus were in the hands of a priest without any knowledge or experience of how the game is played on the international political chessboard, but – nevertheless – ready to disagree and clash with all the Greek governments of the time.
• The degradation of our adversaries' ability to regroup and methodically claim the achievement of their objectives. Truly impressive was Mustafa Kemal's ability to transform – within two years – the floundering Ottoman Empire into a new politically and militarily organized state and to convince international powers to support him, on the basis that he would be the final winner of the Greco-Turkish war. There was a corresponding downgrading of Turkey's determination to come to the aid of the Turkish Cypriots, who, after the events of the 60s and the July 15 coup, felt threatened with annihilation.
• The “national division” – The division of the Greek people into Venizelics and Philobassilics in '22 and into Macarians and Griviki in '74. In both cases it was a fight to the finish. And the last ones were two national drag losses.
• The misrecognition of the postulate that in the international political arena, interests are the determining factor of developments. In both 1922 and 1974, the major interests were Middle Eastern oil and control of the Suez Canal.
The big difference between the Asia Minor Disaster of 1922 and the Cyprus Disaster of 1974 was in the objectives of the Turkish side of these two war conflicts. In the case of the Asia Minor Catastrophe, the goal of the Young Turks was to regain control of the entire territory of Asia Minor and to force all Greek-speaking Christians and Armenians to permanently and irrevocably leave the territory of Asia Minor, in order to achieve the desired homogenization of the populations of Asia Minor in terms of their ethnic origin. Once the reconstruction of the Turkish army and the crushing of the Greek forces in the battles of the Sangarios River in the autumn of 1921 were achieved, the point was to expel the undesirables in a way that made it impossible for them to return. The method used was primitive but effective: Use of violence against civilians to the highest degree, the culmination of which was the burning and leveling of the Greek and Armenian quarters of Smyrna, but also other areas where Greek-speaking Christian populations thrived.
In contrast to the events in Asia Minor and Pontus, the immediate goal in the case of Cyprus was the partition of the island into a purely Turkish-speaking Muslim region and a Greek-speaking Christian region. In order to achieve this goal, the use of limited force, beyond that which was necessary to deal with the resistance offered by the National Guard, was sufficient. In the first phase of the Turkish invasion, military clashes focused on the landing of Turkish forces in northern Cyprus, 8 km west of Kyrenia, and the dropping of paratroopers into the main Turkish Cypriot enclave between the Pentadaktylos mountain range and Nicosia, in order to secure the enclave's borders from possible attacks by the Greek Cypriot forces. In the second phase of the Turkish invasion, the created bridgehead was extended, with relative ease, east towards Famagusta, in order to ensure the control of the large port of the city and the strategically important peninsula of Karpasia. At the same time, the occupied area was extended to the west, in order to ensure the control of the area of Morphou and, by extension, almost the entire coastline of northern Cyprus.
Of course, the relatively small area of Cyprus had the consequence that inhabited areas were often found between the belligerents and thus the civilians were forced to leave their homes without being able to take with them anything beyond the absolute necessities. Typical was the case of Famagusta, which was abandoned by its inhabitants after a very limited aerial bombardment of the coastal area. All the inhabitants of the city left in their own cars, being sure that they would return within 2-3 days. Thus Turkey's goals were achieved in full, with relative ease, creating a wave of refugees of the order of 200 thousand, who moved to the free areas, literally “with the pants they were wearing”, leaving behind their houses, businesses, machines, goods, valuables and happy memories.
In this respect the refugees of Cyprus were very similar to the refugees of Smyrna, in the sense that they lost everything within a very short period of time, with the difference that their movement was relatively easy, as was securing some kind of – even temporary accommodation in the free areas. Several of the refugees sought a new life outside Cyprus – mainly in Greece and England. In fact, many of them never returned.
The book commemorates and evaluates all the Presidents of the Republic of Cyprus to date. Were there “Solution Presidents”?
Unfortunately, in 2017, a good opportunity to reverse the fait accompli of the 1974 war was lost. For inexplicable reasons, the then leader of the Greek Cypriots, assisted by the current President of the Republic of Cyprus and the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nikos Kotzias, stalled the peace process, targeting Turkey for the possibility of creating two separate Cypriot states, i.e. adopting the Turkish solution of the partition of Cyprus. Have there been solution Presidents? Most of the leaders of the Greek Cypriot side did not have the courage to take those decisions that would lead to the reunification of Cyprus, putting forward incoherent and unterritorial but pro-people positions, such as “the return of all refugees to their homes”, “the long-term struggle”, “the unified defense doctrine”, the demand for international condemnation of Turkey and the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots until they are forced to accept the Greek Cypriot positions. Unfortunately, the 50 years that have passed since the 1974 war have proven that the strategies followed by the Greek Cypriot leaderships, with the exception of Vassiliou and partly Cleridis (only regarding Cyprus's accession to the European Union and the Annan plan), were childish and inconclusive.
Does the book provide a way out of the Cypriot impasse?
The book does not provide a way out of the impasse. It simply refers to the proposal for a solution to the Cyprus problem that was formed by a twelve-member bicommunal committee of distinguished compatriots of ours, which was well received by the international community. This proposal is posted online (eastmed-thinktank.com) for your readers to view with ease. My own assessment is that the chance we have to put the situation together is the last and we must not miss it.
Christos P. Panagiotidis.
When the book is presented
Next Tuesday, April 9, at 19:00, the presentation of the book by Christos P Panagiotidis “The Asia Minor Catastrophe of 1922 and the Cypriot Catastrophe of 1974 – A Comparative Narrative” in the event hall of the Nicosia Journalism Center, on RIK avenue by Papazisis Publications. The coordinator will be Akis Montanios, while the Minister of Shipping and Island Policy of Greece, Christos Stylianidis, will address the greeting. The address will be delivered by the president of the Department of Mediterranean Studies of the University of the Aegean and director of the “International and European Politics” series of Papazisis Publications Sotiris Dalis. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ioannis Kasoulidis, the head of the Cyprus Office of AKEL Toumazos Tsielepis and the rector of the University of Cyprus Tasos Christofidis will speak about the book. This will be followed by the rebuttal of the author Christos Panagiotidis himself.
