Application to join BRICS, seeking alliances beyond the West
AP Photo/Markus Schreiber
Having expressed its interest in the BRICS group for several months, Turkey officially submitted yesterday an application to join the association of emerging markets, or “the association of the Global South”, as many prefer to describe this motley group of countries. .
It is the group originally created by Brazil, Russia, India and China, from whose initials the acronym BRIC comes, to which South Africa and the initial letter S were soon added, and which was enlarged in early 2024 with accession of Iran, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Egypt. In this last enlargement, it was agreed last year at this time that Saudi Arabia would also join, but its membership has been “frozen”. Turkey's obvious pursuit by approaching these countries is to make alliances beyond its traditional allies, the so-called Western camp, and to expand its influence in other geographical zones with other geopolitical interests.
According to sources close to the Turkish president, Tayyip Erdogan believes that the geopolitical center of gravity is shifting from developed economies to the developing world. The same sources, who preferred anonymity, underlined that the new moves of the Erdogan government reflect its ambition to cultivate ties of cooperation and alliance with all sides of a multipolar world, while at the same time it will remain a strategic ally of the West and a member of NATO.
When it expressed its interest in joining the BRICS group months ago, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan attributed the move to Ankara's discomfort, which sees no progress in its efforts to join the EU. Political analysts add, after all, that there is tension in Turkey's relations with its NATO allies because of its insistence on maintaining close ties with Russia after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The ruling Justice and Development Party has, after all, repeatedly accused Western countries of trying to block Turkey's ambition to develop a self-sufficient defense industry and a strong economy.
In his speech in Istanbul during the weekend, the Turkish president emphasized that “Turkey can emerge as a strong, prosperous and efficient country with prestige if it improves its relations with the East and the West at the same time.” And he added that “any other method than this is not going to benefit Turkey, but will harm it”. The attempt to approach the BRICS group, which notably seems to show some reticence towards Turkey precisely because it is a member of NATO, is aimed at this goal. The group in question appears on the international scene as an alternative to institutions dominated by the Western world, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Among other things, it offers its new members access to financing through the development bank it has established. At the same time, it enables them to expand their political alliances and expand their trade ties.
After all, Turkey's interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was founded by Russia and China as a rival to the North Atlantic Alliance, appears to be part of the same goal. “We are not obliged to choose between the E.U. and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as some say,” Erdogan emphasized and underlined that “on the contrary, we must develop our relations both with these two organizations, as well as with others, with the aim of mutual benefit.” Turkey is looking to join the BRICS as a means to improve economic cooperation relations with Russia and China and to emerge as a kind of trade channel between Europe and Asia. After all, it seeks to become a hub for the transport of natural gas exports from Russia and Central Asia. As part of this pursuit, it yesterday signed an agreement with Shell that will supply it with 4 billion cubic meters of LNG per year, while providing for Turkey's right to export it to terminals in Europe.
The Erdogan government is, after all, trying to attract investment from Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers that could take advantage of Turkey's customs union with the EU. to gain access to its markets. On the sidelines of the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in June, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized that “this organization increases diversity, identities and political approaches in the global economic system”.
At the same time, however, Turkey is trying to rekindle the talks for its accession to the EU, which it characterizes as a “strategic goal”, as Mr. Fidan emphasized after the informal talks he had with his EU counterparts. on the sidelines of the session and it was the first time in almost five years.
Ankara's geopolitical shift towards Anatolia
In January, the Turkish National Assembly ratified the Sweden's entry into NATO, marking the end of nearly two years of obstruction by the Ankara government.
Turkey used as a pretext for its refusal the permission granted by the Swedish authorities to the Kurdish rebel organization PKK to raise funds and their tolerance for the presence of members of the organization on Swedish soil. Turkish disagreements disappeared, however, once Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan secured what he was asking for: 40 F-16 jets from the US, an upgrade to Turkey's existing aircraft fleet and a meeting with President Joe Biden, according to an article by Turkish-American political scientist Soner. Chagaptai in Foreign Affairs magazine.
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<p><em><strong>Tayyip Erdogan does not share the emotional bond of 20th century Turkish leaders with Europe. Ankara currently trades with Iran, Russia, the USA, the Emirates, the E.U. and all international players without feeling obliged to choose a privileged partner. [REUTERS]</strong></em></p>
<p>The $23 billion deal with Ankara is no small deal, as it marks, among other things, the lifting of an informal US arms embargo on Turkey, imposed in 2017 after Erdogan's decision to buy Russian anti-missile system.</p>
<p>At the same time, the failure of Turkey's accession negotiations with the E.U. and Erdogan's way of exercising power revealed that the roots of modern Turkey lie in Anatolia. The presidential Justice and Development Party AKP offers a good example of Anatolia's rise in the country's political scene. The morals of the party were formed in the depths of Anatolia and on the shores of the Black Sea, the place of origin of Erdogan's parents, but also in the East, home of the Kurdish minority.</p>
<p>The president's cabinet has traditionally been filled with officials from these regions. Politicians with Balkan roots have disappeared from the scene. This phenomenon is also recorded in the public sector, in the judiciary and in the media.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the influence of the Turkish industry association TUSIAD, traditionally dominated by people from Constantinople, Smyrna and businessmen from the old provinces of the Ottoman Empire , shrinks. The new business elite from Anatolia and the Black Sea opposes a political Kurdish solution, calls for a break with secular Kemalism and seeks closer ties with Russia.</p>
<p>This shift in the political center of gravity reflects Turkey's new demographics and the strengthening of elite influence from Anatolia. Their members consider Islam to be an integral part of Turkish national identity.</p>
<p>During the Erdogan years, relations with Russia improved. The two countries continue to compete, finding themselves in different camps in Syria, Libya, the South Caucasus and Ukraine, with Ankara backing Kiev diplomatically and militarily. Despite this rivalry, however, Erdogan and Vladimir Putin built a close personal relationship after the failed coup in Turkey in 2016. At the time, the West missed a unique opportunity to publicly support Turkey and its democracy.</p>
<p>Putin, by contrast, welcomed Erdogan two weeks after the coup attempt. This, in turn, led to mutual retreats and understandings in Syria and Libya, even though Ankara and Moscow are in opposing camps of these crises.</p>
<p>A century after its founding by Kemal Atatürk, Turkey it found its geopolitical location in Anatolia, the crossroads between the Middle East, Europe and Eurasia. This Turkey still considers itself to belong to Europe, unless that means losing its national characteristics.</p>
<p>Erdogan does not share the sentimental link of 20th century Turkish leaders to Europe. Ankara currently trades with Iran, Russia, the USA, the Emirates, the E.U. and all international players without feeling obliged to choose a privileged partner. This new Turkey will certainly remain a member of NATO, but will at the same time build relations and alliances with countries in the Middle East and Eurasia. Ukrainian troops often use Turkish-made Bayraktar drones, although trade between Ankara and Moscow has increased since the outbreak of war in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Erdogan, however, no longer seems willing to stand up to the West. After his victory in the 2023 presidential election, he no longer faces an opponent, while he consciously began to take care of his reputation. This offers an opportunity for Joe Biden and his successor to embrace the new Turkey and make it a helper and partner in the reconstruction of Ukraine and Gaza, but also in curbing Russian and Chinese influence in Africa and the Balkans. Turkey does not wish to become part of the West and the US must respect that, writes the Turkish-American analyst, director of the Turkish research program at the Washington Institute for the Near East.</p>
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The high interest rates hinder the growth of the Turkish economy
Although they have so far failed to tame inflation, which is at 62%, the high interest rates of the Turkish lira are beginning to hamper the growth of the Turkish economy, and its growth rate is now slowing significantly and more than economic analysts had estimated.
In the second quarter of the year, the Turkish economy of 1.2 trillion. dollars grew by just 2.5% on an annual basis, when in the previous quarter it grew at a rate of 5.3% and economists in a related Bloomberg poll predicted that the second quarter would slow to 3.2%.
Domestic demand boosted growth in the first quarter as the basic wage rose significantly and expectations of further acceleration in inflation pushed Turkish households into rush purchases before prices rose further, economic analysts said. Gradually, however, interest rates and high inflation are holding back private consumption and growth, as evidenced by statistics showing that domestic consumption grew by just 1.6% in the second quarter, when growth in the first quarter of the year was 6.8%. Indicative is, after all, the course of imports, the growth of which slowed to 5.7% on an annual basis. Interest rates have been unchanged for several months at 50%, a percentage that the Bank of Turkey has brought them to after successive increases in the last 16 months or so. Tight monetary policy hit some manufacturing industries, particularly textiles, and the manufacturing sector shrank 1.8% year-on-year.
Source: Bloomberg
