It has been 57 years since the junta came to power, when a handful of elected colonels, in the early hours of April 21, 1967, overthrew democracy, imposed a dictatorship, imprisoned, tortured, murdered and exiled resistance fighters
It was a seven-year period that proved to be catalyst for the course of Hellenism and which determined the subsequent course of both Greece and Cyprus.
They attempt an assessment of the junta in their book “Crooked course” (Metaihmio publications) Evanthis Chatzivasiliou and Dimitris Sotiropoulos, in which they present their conclusions on the causes and effects of the dictatorship. Speaking to Philelefthero, Evanthis Chatzivasileiou, professor at the University of Athens and secretary general of the Hellenic Parliament's Foundation for Parliamentarianism and Democracy said that the junta “was a hijacking, in which a clique of insignificant military men, low in the hierarchy, took over the state. There was no popular support for the imposition of the junta and never during its time in power did the junta gain popular support,” he said, adding that it was not a regime that was imposed from outside but from internal causes.
He pointed out. how the dictatorship wasif a regime a cabal of senior officers, without popular support, who lacked the ability or resources to exercise power either civil or military. Something that, as the Greek historian mentioned, was clearly seen when Turkey invaded Cyprus. A development that the junta had not only failed to foresee but also to deal with, resulting in the Turkish invasion and occupation. “The Juntis, although military, did not know how to wage war. They only knew how to make coups. But when things reached a war conflict, they could not manage it,” he explained.
-For what reasons did you decide to write together with Dimitris Sotiropoulos the book Strevli Porea 1960-1974 (Metaihmio Publications)?
– 57 years have now passed since the imposition of the junta, i.e. two generations. A lot of research has been done, even in the archives of various countries and there is a large relevant bibliography in Greece and abroad. We felt that all this allows for more synthetic interpretations and an overall assessment of the causes and consequences of the dictatorship. It is time to do something like this. Our project aims to combine the analysis of the political and the cultural element, something that has not been attempted on such a scale at least until now. We believe that this contributes to the effort to better understand this traumatic event.
-What was the junta of April 21? Was it the result of a group of power-hungry military men, a movement that had popular as well as military support, or a dictatorship imposed from outside?
-It was a hijacking, in which a clique of petty military men, low in the hierarchy, took over the state. There was no popular support for the imposition of the junta and never during its time in power did the junta gain popular support. Nor was the dictatorship of the colonels a regime designed or even accepted by the army leadership: it was the regime of a clique, which after its rise to power took care to demobilize the top officers en masse in order to control the land army. In 1967 the generals would have staged a coup if ordered to do so by the king, but the junta was not such a case. In the book we analyze these dimensions in detail, and it is important to remember that the leaders of the junta were convicted in 1975 of high treason (overthrow of the state) and of standing, that is, of armed rebellion against the army hierarchy and the state leadership. Finally, modern research is clear: the junta was not a regime imposed from outside, but arose from internal causes, specifically from the weaknesses of the Greek political system which, certainly without wanting or expecting it, allowed these elected officers to challenge the regime. In this sense, the junta was the result of a major failure of Greek politics, which could not manage the great political crisis of the years 1963-1967. So the junta was by no means inevitable. But it became possible due to the deadlock and failure of the political system.
-Were there and if so what were the differences between the Papadopoulos junta and the Ioannidis junta?
– The junta of Ioannidis was clearly even more extreme than that of Papadopoulos (which of course was itself extreme) and this was shown in its tragic manipulations in the Cyprus issue which ended in a national disaster. Ioannidis sought a paroxysmal “purity” of the “revolution”, which, given the ideological shallowness of the dictators and their complete inability to understand the world, was something disastrous for the nation. However, while there were some individual differences between them, we must not forget that both were versions of the same destructive dictatorial regime. In other words, their similarities far outweighed any differences.
–Much has been said about the role of the Americans. Was the junta a US puppet? What was their relationship like during the seven years it lasted?
– The Americans did not benefit from a dictatorship in Greece, nor a dictatorship of the king, let alone such a dictatorship of relatively low-ranking officers with such nationalist tendencies and an inability to understand the stakes of politics, internal and external. The Americans did not cause or help the junta rise to power. There is a lot of evidence that shows the surprise of the American agencies, even the CIA, on the morning of April 21, 1967. In this sense, the imposition of the junta was a major failure of the American agencies as well. However, after the imposition of the junta, and facing major geopolitical challenges more broadly, e.g. the war in Vietnam, but also especially in the Mediterranean (Six Day War in June 1967, Soviet naval presence) the Americans accepted it even if they despised it politically. Therefore he was not their puppet. It was a forced cohabitation relationship.
-What were the consequences for Greece? How decisive was the seven-year dictatorship for the political and social system of the country?
-The junta violently interrupted the modernization process of the country as well as the great cultural and aesthetic renewal of attitudes that had been triggered by the economic development of 1953-67. It was an explosion of ultraconservatism and reactionary, political and cultural. Its seven years and its fall led the pendulum to move in the other direction, with the legitimization of the ethnic populism expressed by the junta, the maximization of the anti-Western spirit, the discrediting of the pro-Western, centrist political forces in Greece. It suspended the country's progress towards Europe but did not bring about its end. But it caused an unimaginable extent of destruction in Cyprus, which we have not yet managed to rebuild. In other words, and this is a key position of the book, the junta was not simply a “parenthesis” after which things returned to a “normal” state. In Cyprus especially, such a thing was no longer possible.
-In your opinion, did Greece manage to leave that period behind or are there remnants that still plague it.
– We have certainly not yet managed to undo the damage in Cyprus, the biggest, beyond any comparison, of the disasters caused by the junta. Apart from Cyprus, Greece managed to face and leave behind several of the damages caused by the junta, but not all, not completely. The discrediting of the West, populism, cheap conspiracy theories, all these were either consciously promoted by the junta or facilitated by its ridiculousness. I am not sure that even today, at the political and social level in Greece, the pendulum has now balanced.
Do you see any common points between the then ethno-populist and anti-systemic mode of action of the junta and the mode of action of far-right and populist parties today?
-The inability to accurately, realistically, and effectively understand the world is a basic commonality. And it is extremely dangerous for our societies, as the Cyprus experience of 1974 shows. Especially for us, small states in the most turbulent region of the world, sobriety and efficiency, avoiding paroxysms, extremes and illusions are conditions for survival in this big and very often dangerous world.
The Juntis did not expect the Turkish invasion
-As you have said, Cyprus paid a heavy price for the junta of colonels. Did they ever consider that their actions would result in Turkish invasion and occupation?
-The Juntis, specifically now Ioannidis and his own group, staged the coup against President Makarios, considering that Turkey would not react with an invasion. As much as this is unthinkable, they – these military men – did not expect the Turkish invasion. In fact, on the morning of July 20, with the Turkish landing fleet in front of Cyprus, they reassured the military authorities on the island that it was a show of force and that the Turks would not land. This is shocking even today. However, it should be remembered that the junta were not supreme officers, but superiors. They had not received training to command the armed forces in wartime. They didn't know how to make war. They only knew how to make coups. But when things reached a war conflict they could not manage it.
-However, why did they not do anything to help Cyprus when the Turkish invasion began?
-The junta had not prepared for an invasion and did not expect it. On the morning of July 20, key elite strike forces were not in the right positions to deal with a possible invasion. E.g. the two modern submarines were in the Cyclades and not in Kyrenia where they could have hit the landing fleet. It took them two days of diving to reach Kyrenia, and it must not be forgotten that if they arrived on July 22, they would find the Turkish bridgehead entrenched. The modern “Phantom” aircraft were not in Crete to operate against the Turks while they were still in the water and had not set foot on the island, i.e. the time when a landing force is most vulnerable and the defender has a greater ability to repel it . The Greek forces in Cyprus had not been reinforced to face an invasion. And the Greek armed forces in Greece itself were not prepared for a Greek-Turkish crisis: even the islands of the Eastern Aegean were unfortified and at the mercy of Turkey. Finally, we should not forget the failure of the mobilization announced by the regime on July 20, a phenomenon unique worldwide, that is, a military regime not being able to mobilize! Of course, it wasn't just the lack of preparation. The very actions of the dictators, i.e. the coup against Makarios, offered Turkey the pretext for the invasion, but also disorganized the defense of Cyprus.
Cyprus, not the Polytechnic, overthrew the junta.
-Was the uprising the pivotal point for the fall of the junta or was it finally the Turkish invasion of Cyprus?
– The Polytechnic uprising was the biggest popular reaction against the junta. Modern research, especially the work of Leonidas Kallibretakis, demonstrates that this was the element that terrorized the dictators and led to the bloody repression: that is to say, that in the case of the Polytechnic the rebellion was not limited to a student mobilization as it had been in the case of the occupation of Law School of Athens a few months before, but it was gaining popular support from the people who gathered from outside. This element was logical to be invoked in the era after the fall of the junta.
However, as is evident even from the chronological sequence of events itself, the uprising of the Polytechnic, in November 1973 , he did not overthrow the junta and did not cause it to fall. The dictatorship in Greece fell in July 1974, several months later, due to the destruction that the junta itself brought about in Cyprus. There are no words to describe the magnitude of the devastation it caused in Cyprus, and because of that devastation it fell. This must not be forgotten.
